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COMPULSORY ARBITRATION- A SOLUTION FOR
INDUSTRIAL CHAOS?
A problem of major importance facing the American peo-
ple today is that of solving labor disputes with a minimum
of discomfort to employees, employers, and the public. Disputes
are almost certain to arise under any system of industrial regula-
tion; nevertheless, an attempt to deal with the problem with the
hope of arriving at an equitable solution must be made. It is to
be expected that any legislative solution of the labor problem will
cause inconvenience and hardship to a degree, but perhaps some
remedy may be contrived which will be an improvement over the
industrial chaos which often ties up vital industries for months at
a time while the public is powerless to bring about a settlement.
Economic warfare between the wage earner and the employer must
be alleviated, for the public has suffered too long and too often.'
A possible remedy for the unsettled conditions now hampering
industry is arbitration of labor disputes. In discussing the question
of arbitration one must make, at the outset, a distinction between
voluntary and compulsory arbitration. If the arbitration statute
requires both parties to submit the dispute for a decision, the arbi-
tration is compulsory, but if neither party is required by law to
submit to arbitration, but do so by agreement, then the arbitration
is voluntary Where a valid contract is entered into by which the
I Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order, 29 HARV. L Ray. 13 (1915) ; Huebner
in his article entitled Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 30 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y
123 (1946) at page 125 asks: "Must the anarchy of the free market in labor relations be
continued, with one of the real parties in interest, the consuming public, incapable of
any controls, except to form an opinion and influence the parties with such public opin-
ion?" Simpson in his article entitled Constitutional Limitations on Compulsory Industrial
Arbitration, 38 HARv. L. REv. 753 (1925) said: "So long as the present industrial system
continues to regulate the economic life of the nation, industrial disputes will continue to
arise; indeed they are almost certain to arise under any conceivable ordering of an indus-
trial society. Since such disputes are bound to occur, they must be settled."
2UPDEGRAFF AND McCoy, ARBITRATION OF LABOR Dtsprs 9 (1946); In re Bill
Relating to Arbitration, 9 Colo. 629, 21 Pac. 474 (1890).
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employer and employees agree to submit to arbitration disputes
arising between them, regardless of whether a means of selecting
arbitrators is agreed upon, it will be specifically enforced by the
courts. This is a voluntary agreement of the parties and the courts,
in enforcing the contract, are merely carrying out their express
intention.' Where the parties agree to arbitrate, and by statute are
then required to accept the award, this too, is voluntary arbitration
and the statute making the agreement irrevocable is constitutional.'
Compulsory arbitration on the other hand is involved where the
parties have not agreed to arbitrate a dispute but are required by
statute to submit their controversy to arbitration.5 Compulsory ar-
bitration can be accomplished either by requiring all labor con-
tracts to include a provision submitting any future dispute to arbi-
tration or, in the absence of such contract, by requiring the parties
to submit any dispute to arbitration. In either type of case, all
labor disputes will be settled by arbitration without the consent of
the parties. A statute providing for compulsory submission of the
dispute to arbitration but providing for voluntary acceptance of
an award would not in a strict sense be compulsory arbitration
at all, for neither labor nor industry would ever be forced to settle
a dispute, since their consent to the award would be necessary
to the final disposition of the dispute. Likewise, a statute provid.
ing for voluntary submission to arbitration, but compulsory ac-
ceptance of award is not compulsory arbitration.' As used in this
article, compulsory arbitration will mean compulsory submission
of disputes to arbitration with compulsory acceptance of award.
Voluntary arbitration is certainly a most desirable method of
settling industrial differences, for strikes and lockouts are pre-
vented without coercion of either labor or capital. However the
question may well be asked whether voluntary agreements will be
utilized by the disputing parties. Many states have set up arbitra-
s Note, 69 A. L R. 816 (1930).
4 Ibid.




tion boards to which the parties may voluntarily submit their
dispute for settlement, and all but two states have passed statutes
declaring all arbitration agreements irrevocable and enforceable.'
Many of these states have provided that once arbitration has beet)
agreed upon the award will be binding and both parties may be
compelled by injunction to abide by the decision of the arbitra-
tors.' Texas adopted this type of statute providing for voluntary
submission to arbitration, with compulsory acceptance of the
award of the board.! This legislation is a step in the right direc-
tion, but the question is whether another step should be taken de-
priving the parties Qf their election not to use the processes of
arbitration. It may well be argued that the time for the second
step has come, particularly in industries essential to the public
health and safety.
Kansas was the first state to attempt compulsory arbitration as
a solution to disputes in vital industries.'" The Kansas Act was
passed more than twenty-five years ago after a prolonged and
violent strike in the coal mining industry had occurred within the
state." All labor controversies in industries affected with a "pub-
lic interest," including public utilities, railroads, mining, and the
food and clothing industries, were required to be submitted to
a court of Industrial Relation. Lockouts, strikes, boycotts, picket-
ing and other methods of labor warfare were forbidden."
The constitutionality of the Kansas Act was tested in a series
T Rhode Island and South Dakota have failed to pass voluntary arbitration statutes.
In fact, South Dakota expressly refuses to enforce specifically any arbitration agreement
concerning labor disputes; S. D. CODE § 37.4602 (1939).
8 MASS. GE'. LAws, c. 150, 1 1 (1932) ; Mich. Pub. Act No. 318, Mich. Acts 1947;
MONT. Rev. CODE 3055 (1935) ; Nebr. Laws 1947, I 20, L. B. 537; NEv. Comp. LAws
12763 (1929) ; N. H. REv. LAws c. 210, § 15 (1942); N. J. REv. STAr. § 3413-1 (1937) ;
CONSOL. L.Aws oF N. Y. ANN., art. 21, § 750 (1940); OaE. Comp. LAws ANN., § 102
(1940) ; P NN. STAT. tit. 5, c. 2, § 21 (Purdons, 1936) ; TENN. CoDE ANN. 9359 (Wil-
liams, 1934); W. VA. CODE § 5409 (1943); WIs. STAT. § 111.10 (1943); Wy. REV. STAT.
§ 101-7-124 (1931).
9 TE.. REv. C111. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 239.
10 Kan. Laws (1920) c. 29, § 3a; the Act is reproduced in full in State v. Howat, 109
Kan. 376, 198 Pac. 686, 705 (1921).




of three Supreme Court decisions. In Charles Wolff Packing v.
Court of Industrial Relations" the Meat Cutters Union filed a com-
plaint respecting the wages of its members. The employer, a small
meat-packing company having three hundred employees, refused
to comply with an order of the Industrial Relations Court increas-
ing wages. The Industrial Court instituted a mandamus proceeding
in the Kansas Supreme Court to compel compliance. The packing
company contended that the Act was unconstitutional, but the Kan-
sas Supreme Court upheld the Act and the action of the Industrial
Court.' An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court,
which reversed and held the application of the statute unconsti-
tutional.
In Dorchy v. State of Kansas,"5 decided the next year, the
United States Supreme Court held the Act invalid as applied to
the coal mining industry. A third decision was handed down the
following year, again involving the Wolff Packing Company. The
Supreme Court held the Kansas arbitration statute invalid in re-
gard to hour regulations in the packing industry."
In all of these cases the Act was held to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, which, the court determined, guarantees liberty to
contract.' In the last Wolff Packing case Justice Van Devanter de-
clared:
"Such a system infringes the liberty of, contract and rights of
property guaranteed by the due process of law clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."'"
The public interest in the businesses subject to the act was not
"Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1922),
noted in 37 HAMv. L. REv. 1097 (1925) ; 22 MICH. L. REv. 135 (1924).
1' Court of Industrial Relations v. Charles Wolff Packing Co., 109 Kan. 629, 201 Pac.
418 (1921).
"5 Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 (1923).
26 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 267 U. S. 552 (1924).
11 Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1922);
Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 (1923) ; Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court
267 U. S. 552 (1924).
1s Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 267 U. S. 552, 569 (1924).
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regarded as sufficient to justify the imposition of compulsory ar-
bitration and infringement of the right to contract as one pleases.
The freedom of emloyers and employees to contract in an un-
restricted manner concerning employment is regarded as both
liberty and property, and has been considered as entitled to the
same constitutional protection as property rights of a more sub-
stantial nature. The right to refrain from entering into contracts
is regarded as a part of this liberty of contract. Any legislation
restricting or preventing the exercise of this right violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, unless such legislation can be justified
under the police power of the state.19 In the Wolff case the court
refused to apply the doctrine established in Wilson v. New.2" In
the latter case the court was called upon to decide the constitu-
tionality of the Adamson Act2 which established an eight-hour
day for the railroad industry. Before this case, it was thought
that every industrial worker had the right to demand higher wages
or shorter hours and that there existed a corresponding right in
the employer to hire workers on any terms he chose, free from
government intervention. Nevertheless, the court held that these
rights are subject to some qualifications when employment is ac-
cepted in an industry vital to the public. " Chief Justice Taft's
opinion in the first Wolff case however, declared that the doc-
trine announced in the Wilson case was limited in application to
national emergencies or other exceptional circumstances," on the
theory that the freedom to contract could not be abridged unless
the public interest urgently needed protection. In such a case, pri-
vate rights must yield to pressing public need.
It has been contended that a system of compulsory arbitration
will not violate any individual worker's liberty to contract."' Vir-
19 Simpson, supra note 1, at 761.
20 Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917).
21 39 StAT. 721 (1916), 45 U. S. C. § 65 (1940).
22 Wilson v. New, 243, U. S. 332, 353 (1917).
28 Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 533, 544 (1922).
24 Huebner, supra note 1, at 126.
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tually all labor agreements are made by representatives of labor
unions and representatives of industry. Thus the individual worker
usually has only a small voice in the matter. This is especially true
in the larger industries employing many workers. The worker
either accepts the terms of the contract and works the required
hours at the agreed wage, or he does not work. Individual bargain-
ing is vanishing along with the horse and buggy. The only sub-
stantial change that compulsory arbitration would make in the
present situation would be to allow an impartial group to fix the
terms of the contract when the representatives of labor and in-
dustry cannot, or will not, agree.
Notwithstanding the attitude of the Supreme Court in the
Wolff case, many exceptions to the liberty to contract doctrine
have been found. As early as 1898, an act of the Utah Legisla-
ture25 restricting hours of labor in mines and smelters was sus-
tained as a legitimate exercise of the police power, on the ground
that if these occupations were too long pursued, they would injure
the health of the employees. 26 A similar regulation of hours was
upheld in Bunting v. Oregon,7 and another Oregon statute for-
bidding the employment of any female in certain industries for
more than ten hours a day was upheld.26
In 1919, an Act of Congress"9 fixed minimum wages for women
and children in the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court
pointed out that this was a restraint on the freedom to contract
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, and the Act was therefore
held unconstitutional. ° This decision, the source of much unrest
in state legislatures, was expressly overruled in 1938." It seems
25 Utah Laws 1896, c. 72.
26 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898).
2? Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1916).
28 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908).
29 40 STAT. 960, c. 174 (1918).
30 Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
31 In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) at page 391, Chief Justice
Hughes said: "The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of lib-
erty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting
that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable lib-
1948)
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well established that a state may regulate hours, wages, or any
other aspect of employment relations where the public interest
needs safeguarding. Certain industries are of vital importance to
the general health, safety and welfare, and the public interest in
them should be sufficient to warrant legislation calculated to pre-
vent prolonged industrial disruption. A system of compulsory ar-
bitration for industries affected with a public interest would seem
to be as much within the police power of the state as is a minimum
wage act. '2 One writer has stated:
"We may safely assume that in the field of regulating and re-
stricting the individual liberty of contract, the Supreme Court will
allow any legislative measures which it is made to feel are calculated
to promote the public welfare." 3
The opponents of compulsory arbitration urge that such legisla-
tion will result in prohibition of strikes and therefore will cause
involuntary servitude.3 Of course, any legislation designed to ric
the public of economic warfare between unions and employers
will have to forbid strikes (and lockouts) in order to be effective.
If strikes are permitted, the very purpose of the legislation will
be defeated, for any arbitration statute must provide means of en-
forcing the arbitration award. The acceptance of the award can
only be enforced by requiring the parties to refrain from strikes,
lockouts and work stoppages. But this does not mean that invol-
untary servitude will follow as a necessary consequence. The legis-
lation will not prevent a worker from quitting at any time he
wishes, nor will it compel him to work, and it is only forced labor
erty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty safe-
guarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against
the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. liberty under
the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interest of the commu-
nity is due process."
s2 Local Union No. 876, Etc. v. State of Michigan Labor Mediation Board, 294 Mich.
629, 293 N. W. 809 (1940).
33 Anthony, Attitude of Supreme Court Towards Liberty of Contract, 6 Tax. L Rsv.
266 (1927).
34 Simpson, supra note 1, at 783.
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that is prohibited by the Thirteenth Ainendment. The arbitration
statute will prohibit any united or planned walk-outs, and will
also forbid the publication of any union mandate ordering such
concerted action. In spite of the fact that the individual remains
free to quit, the prohibition of planned mass walk-outs is a power-
ful deterrent to assure compliance with the award of the arbitra-
tors.
The failure of the Kansas arbitration statute discouraged legis-
lation of this type for a dozen or more years, but the idea was by
no means dead. During the recent war, the Federal Government
settled major labor disputes by imposing virtual compulsory arbi-
tration operating under executive orders of the President and
under Congressional authority as expressed in the Stabilizatioi
Act and the Smith-Connally Act."5 At the present time nine states
have passed compulsory arbitration laws applicable to public
utilities.3" With one exception 8 all these laws were enacted in
1947.
The Missouri Statute may be taken as typical of this legislation.
It provides that compulsory arbitration shall be used in adjusting
differences between management and labor in all industries en-
gaged in producing, distributing, selling or otherwise furnishing
electric light, heat, gas, steam, water, sewer services, or transpor-
tation excepting railroads and communication. 9 It provides that
compulsory arbitration shall not be effective in disputes where
35 Ibid.; The court in People v. United Mine Workers of America, 70 Colo. 269, 201
Pac. 54, 56 (1921) said: "There is no involuntary servitude under this act. Any individual
workman may quit at will for any reason or no reason."
'6 UPOECRAFF AND McCoY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 10.
37 Mo. Laws 1947, § 1-22, H. B. 180; MiNN. STAT., c. 179, § 179.07 (1941) ; Mich. Laws
1947, pub. acts No. 318, § 13; Gen. Laws of Mass. 1947, c. 150 B, § 1; N~m. CoNsT. Art.
XV, § 9; Laws of Nebr. 1947, § 20, L. B. 537; N. J. Laws 1947, c. 47, § 34:13; Penn. Laws
1947, act 485; Ind. Laws 1947, c. 334, § 8(D) ; Fla. Laws 1947, c. 23911, §1.
38 Minn. Stat., c. 179, § 179.07 (1941). In Virginia a statute was passed prohibiting
strikes and lockouts in any public utility, providing for seizure by the Governor if a
serious threat of strike or lockout is made, and providing for replacement of employees
who refused to work, Va. laws 1947, c. 9, § 1.39Mo. Laws 1947, § 1, H. B. 180.
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voluntary arbitration is a part of the contract, unless such volun-
tary arbitration agreement fails."0
To avoid any possible declaration that the act violates the Thir-
teenth Amendment, two states have specifically provided that the
act does not force labor without the employee's consent." As yet,
none of the statutes have been declared unconstitutional, and the
Michigan Supreme Court has upheld the Michigan statute." Since
the statutes apply only to public utility industries, whose con-
tinuous, uninterrupted operation is indispensable to the public,
there is good reason to believe they will be sustained as valid exer-
cises of the states' police power."3
TEXAS
In 1920 the Texas Industrial Commission was organized to in-
vestigate labor disputes in Texas." When the Governor believes
a controversy between employers and employees is affected with
a public interest, he is to refer the case to the Commission for
hearing and report. The Commission, which has power to summon
witnesses and to punish for contempt, conducts an investigation
and makes public a report on the controversy. Apparently the in-
tent of the Legislature was to use the Commission as an instru-
ment for publicizing the facts of a labor dispute and to bring
public opinion to bear to cause a just settlement. It should be ob-
served that the Industrial Commission has no power to compel
40 Mo. Laws 1947, § 5, 11. B. 180.
,1 Fla. Laws 1947, c. 23911, § 19; Mo. Laws 1947, § 22, H. B- 180.
42 Local Union No. 876 v. State of Michigan Labor Med. Bd., 294 Mich. 629, 293 N. W.
809 (1940).
48 In an address to the Ohio State Bar Association printed in 19 OHIO STATE BAt
AssoctAnON REPORT 146, 149 (1946), Donald Richberg said: "In the case of public
utility services at least, it seems clear that, since the properties are devoted to public use
and subject to public regulation as to rates and service, the law might well impose on
workers accepting such employment three obligations: first, to attempt peaceful settle-
ment of disputes; second, if unable to reach agreement, to submit the issues to an impar-
tial arbitration; and, third, to avoid any concerted withdrawal from employment." Simp.
son, supra note 1 at 784 said: "Compulsory arbitration is due process of law when applied
to public utility industries or to essential industries.. 
"TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5186.
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settlement of disputes, nor does it have the power to prevent strikes
during its investigations. Undoubtedly publicity is and has been
a strong force in causing settlement of labor controversies. In
many instances, however, it is suspected that neither labor unions
nor employers yield merely because the general public believes
a particular settlement should be reached.
A few changes in the Texas Industrial Commission would make
it effective to prevent strikes and lockouts in vital industries. At
the present time the Commission is composed of five members,
one representing labor, one representing employers and three rep-
resenting the public. This is an appropriate organization to ac-
complish the purpose for which it was created, for its essential
function is to inform the public of the facts. Since the Commission
cannot compel any action by the disputing parties, no harm is done
in making the public members a majority. However, if arbitration
powers were given the Commission, an increase in number of labor
and employer representatives would be desirable. Management
and unions would have greater confidence in the Commission if
they knew that their representatives, who presumably are better
acquainted with industrial conditions, could out vote the public
members. An enlargement of the Commission to seven members.
with three representatives from the public, and two members each
from labor and industry, might be wise. This arrangement would
prevent any settlement adverse to both labor and industry and at
the same time would give the public adequate representation. New
Jersey, in its public utility compulsory arbitration act, has adopted
a mediation board having this composition. '
At the present time the Governor is given power to declare
what industries are affected with a public interest. The statute
empowers the Governor to determine whether an emergency exists
in any industry and allows him to decide what industries are of
such a public nature as to demand investigation. If the Industrial
Commission were given power to arbitrate disputes by compulsion,
45 N. J. Laws 1947, c. 47, § 34:13-B, § 20.
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it would certainly be preferable that the Legislature declare what
industries vitally affect the public interest. Public utilities should
be first on this list of industries, for as has been pointed out a
precedent has already been established in this field. If the statute
operated satisfactorily, other industries might be added to the list,
whose uninterrupted operation is essential to the welfare of the
public.
The remaining alteration needed is to give the Commission
power to enforce its award. Criminal sanctions might be imposed,
and violations punished by fine, imprisonment, or both. Injunctive
relief might also be provided to prevent violation of the arbitra-
tion award. As a last resort the legislation could provide for
seizure of the business plant in the event of strike or lockout, as
has been done in four states."
CONCLUSION
Under a system of compulsory arbitration, labor unions and
employers could still come to agreement on any terms found ac-
ceptable to them. In the event of such peaceful settlement, the
voluntary agreement would replace any previous award by the
arbitration tribunal. No doubt the mere formation of a compulsory
arbitration commission would bring about many peaceful settle-
ments in disputes which otherwise would result in prolonged
strikes. In the event no settlement were reached, impartial arbi-
trators could determine the reasonable and equitable solution. In
either case the public would benefit, for the economic waste caused
by idle industry would be avoided. No longer would obstinate
representatives of labor or of management be able to cause indus-
trial standstills, for every dispute would be determined promptly
by a fair and equitable arbitration award.
Labor unions would still play an important role since the skill
of union representatives in presenting their cause of complaint to
46 Gen. Laws of Mass. 1947, c. 150 B, § 1; Mo. Laws 1947, § 1, H. B. 180; N. J. Laws
1947, c. 47, § 34:13; Va. Laws 1947, c. 9, § 18.
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the arbitrators would play an important part in determining the
terms of the contract. Compulsory arbitration has already been in-
stituted in nine states, and the report is that it is operating smooth-
ly abroad." There is no reason that the people of Texas cannot
put aside lockouts, strikes and boycotts in public utilities and
other vital industries and attempt peaceful settlement of labor
differences by arbitration.
Win. Kent Ratliff.
,7 Jones, Industrial Arbitration in Australia, 8 Moo. L REv. 63 (1945).
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